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The collapse of a number of companies as a result of accounting manipulation by managers has raised 
and control managerial opportunistic behaviour.  This study examines financial performance, 
environmental characteristics and governance mechanisms on fraudulent financial reporting in 
Malaysia.  Logit regression was performed on a sample of 36 fraud firms and 46 no-fraud firms for the 
period of 2001 to 2009. The predictive accuracy of the logistic regression model is 66.1 percent.  This 
study found that the greater the direct shares of the company owned by the board of director, the 
lesser would be the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. High stock ownership of board of 
director will increase the firm value, thus eliminating some of the inherent agency conflicts between 
the management and shareholders which is related to managers making decisions to benefit 
themselves rather than the shareholders. Even though the internal control quality was found not to 
contribute significantly to fraudulent financial reporting, it was found that fraud companies, have 
lesser voluntary disclosure of internal control system compared to no-fraud companies. 
This study also found that the shorter the tenure of the CEO, the greater the tendency of the company 
to be involved in fraudulent financial reporting. It could be that fraudulent financial reporting activities 
were detected earlier rather than later, which could have led to the earlier termination of CEOs who 
were found to be fraudulent. 
According to Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012, it is recommended that the maximum 
tenure for independent directors should be a term of 9 years. However, others in the Corporate 
Governance Sector suggest an absolute term limits for directors, including CEOs who are directors be 
introduced. It is suggested that shareholders should be the group responsible to determine the tenure 
of CEOs, which could be the maximum of 9 years or shorter depending on whether the shareholders 
are happy with their performance.
MICG has agreed to the publication of the above extract in its newsletter in the interests of encouraging debate as 
an essential element of the development of thought and progress in the field of Corporate Governance best practice. 
MICG has not sighted or validated the data behind the study which led to the above extract and does not express 
any opinion as to the findings and recommendations contained in the study or the above extract.
